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Abstract
We develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege–Geach problem by taking
up recent insights from the bilateral programme in logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning
of negation from a primitive B-type inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dis-
sent. Some may demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms, but we argue
that bilateralism’s assumptions are no less explanatory than those of A-type semantics that
only require a single primitive attitude, but must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based
on these insights, we develop a version of B-type expressivism called inferential expressiv-
ism. This is a novel semantic framework that characterises meanings by inferential roles
that define which attitudes one can infer from the use of terms. We apply this framework
to normative vocabulary, thereby solving the Frege–Geach problem generally and compre-
hensively. Our account moreover includes a semantics for epistemic modals, thereby also
explaining normative terms under epistemic modals.
1 Introduction
Expressivism about a class of linguistic terms holds that the meaning of these terms is to be ex-
plained by appealing to the mental attitudes that these terms are used to express. Historically,
expressivism has been applied to normative terms by taking, say, wrong to express the non-
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cognitive (desire-like) attitude of disapproval1 (Hare, 1952), but has more recently been exten-
ded to other terms (e.g. Humberstone, 2000; Schnieder, 2010; Yalcin, 2012). Expressivism is
appealing and entrenched, but—no matter its application—must contend with the Frege–Geach
embedding problem (Frege, 1919; Geach, 1965; Schroeder, 2008b). The goal of this paper is to
use insights from expressivism about negation to develop a novel form of expressivism about
normative terms. As we shall show, this novel form of expressivism has the resources to solve
the Frege–Geach problem generally and comprehensively.
In its original version, the Frege–Geach problem challenges the expressivist to explain how
a term that putatively expresses an attitude can embed in conditional antecedents. However,
current debate centres on the negation version of the Frege–Geach problem (Unwin, 1999,
2001; Schroeder, 2008a). In brief, it goes as follows. As we rehearse in Section 2, the negation
of a descriptive term appears to be different from the negation of a term that (putatively) is
treated in expressivist terms. To wit, the two normative claims Murdering is wrong and Mur-
dering is not wrong, if receiving expressivist treatment, must be read as expressing different
attitudes towards the same content. Thus, it seems that not here modifies attitudes. However, in
the descriptive claims Murdering is legal and Murdering is not legal, the term not modifies the
content of what is claimed. The expressivist is challenged to explain these facts without any ad
hoc stipulations. The problem permeates semantic analysis on different levels; we discuss its
different aspects in Section 2.
We propose to solve the negation problem by adopting the framework of inferential ex-
pressivism. Inferential expressivism is a general semantic framework that grows out of the
bilateral programme in logic (Rumfitt, 2000; Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017). Very briefly, ex-
pressivism explains terms by reference to the attitudes they are used to express, inferentialism
explains terms by reference to the inferences they feature in, and inferential expressivism ex-
plains terms by reference to what attitudes one can infer from their use. The possibility of com-
bining expressivism with inferentialism is acknowledged (Chrisman, 2008; Baker and Woods,
2015; Tiefensee, 2016), but we are the first to develop it systematically and to give all formal
details of an inferential expressivist account of normative language. Moreover, our inferential
1We stipulatively call the attitude expressed by wrong ‘disapproval’, but any other term would do.
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expressivism includes an account of epistemic modals (Incurvati and Schlöder, Forthcoming).
Building on this prior work, our account also explains how epistemic modals interact with
normative vocabulary, improving on the analysis of Mark Schroeder (2008a), which encoun-
ters difficulties with sentences like Murdering might be wrong.
Our inferential expressivism allows us to locate the difference between normative and de-
scriptive vocabulary entirely at the level of lexical semantics. To wit, on our account uttering
a declarative sentence standardly expresses assent to a proposition, where the meaning of that
proposition is given by inference rules. Descriptive terms have attitude invariant inferential
semantics; e.g., the semantics of bachelor is such that from the expression of assent to pJohn
is a bachelorq one can infer assent to pJohn is unmarriedq.2 In contrast, normative terms have
attitude changing inferential semantics; the term wrong receives an inferential semantics such
that from assent to pmurdering is wrongq one infers the different attitude disapproval towards
pmurderingq. This is the only difference needed to define inferential expressivist semantics for
logical operators—in particular, negation—that behave as they should.
In the next section we describe the different aspects of the negation problem in detail.
Then, in Section 3, we introduce inferential expressivism, extend it to a semantics for norm-
ative vocabulary like wrong, and discuss how this solves the negation problem. Finally, we
compare our approach to Schroeder’s (2008a) influential solution in Section 4, arguing that we
improve on his account by solving what he calls the new new negation problem related to norm-
ative sentences involving epistemic modals. We conclude in Section 5 by locating inferential
expressivism within the metaethical landscape.
2 The negation problem
Expressivists claim that a sentence like Murdering is wrong (1a) is used to express the attitude
of disapproval towards the act of murdering. The expressivist problem with negation is to
2In order to distinguish sentences from what they express, we encase contents one can have attitudes (both
cognitive and non-cognitive) towards in Gödel brackets; e.g. asserting John is unmarried expresses assent to the
proposition pJohn is unmarriedq. Formulae and variables generally stand for such contents, so we do not bracket
them.
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explain what is expressed by Murdering is not wrong (1b). There is one clear constraint on
any such explanation: to utter both (1a) and (1b) sounds inconsistent and this fact ought to be
explained.3
(1) a. Murdering is wrong.
b. Murdering is not wrong.
c. Not murdering is wrong.
d. Not murdering is not wrong.
Which attitude is expressed by (1b)? It cannot be disapproval of not murdering, since that
is what one expresses by uttering (1c). It is a mistake to equate (1b) with (1c), since (1c)
is inconsistent with (1d), whereas (1b) is not. Moreover, (1b) cannot express the absence of
disapproval of murdering, as this would wrongly conflate (2a) and (2b).
(2) a. Jane does not think that murdering is wrong. = Jane does not disapprove of murdering
b. Jane thinks that murdering is not wrong. = ?
c. Jane thinks that murdering is wrong. = Jane disapproves of murdering
d. Jane thinks that not murdering is wrong. = Jane disapproves of not murdering
Nick Unwin (1999, 2001) notes that the problem is really quite simple: in Jane does (not)
think that (not) murdering is (not) wrong one can insert up to three negations, and no two
choices should be equivocated. But the expressivist paraphrase Jane does (not) disapprove
of (not) murdering only has space for two, so the expressivist requires an attitude other than
disapproval to describe what attitude is expressed by (1b). One may—by stipulation—call this
attitude tolerance and describe (1b) as the expression of tolerance towards the act of murder.
However, according to Schroeder (2008a), this leaves an explanatory gap. We observed that
Murdering is wrong and Murdering is not wrong are inconsistent—the expressivist needs to
explain this fact. She may attempt to do so by claiming that it is inconsistent to simultaneously
tolerate and disapprove of the same act, in much the same way that it is inconsistent to hold
3Here, ‘inconsistent’ is used pre-theoretically. We discuss the different relevant notions of inconsistency in due
course.
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the attitude of belief towards two inconsistent contents or the attitude of intent towards two
incompatible goals.
Schroeder (2008a), however, argues that this does not suffice. Any putative such explan-
ation appears to entail that the expressivist is committed to there being two ways for attitude
expressions to be inconsistent. First, A-type inconsistency, which arises from holding a single
kind of inconsistency-transmitting attitude, such as belief, towards truth-conditionally incon-
sistent contents (e.g. it is A-type inconsistent to believe both p and not p). Second, B-type
inconsistency, which arises from holding different kinds of attitude that are in some sense mu-
tually exclusive towards the same content. The supposed explanation of the inconsistency of
(1a) and (1b)—that they express, respectively, disapproval and tolerance of the same act—is
B-type. A-type inconsistencies arise in descriptive language: the propositional contents of (3a)
and (3b) are inconsistent and hence it is inconsistent to express belief in both.
(3) a. Murdering is legal.
b. Murdering is not legal.
A-type inconsistency feels familiar, whereas B-type inconsistency may appear to be an artifact
of expressivism. The expressivist cannot, Schroeder (2008a) contends, create the attitude of
tolerance and its B-type properties by fiat. Rather, she needs to explain why there is an attitude
that behaves like what she calls tolerance—by appealing to more fundamental concepts. To
find these concepts or to explain away the complaint is the negation problem.
The expressivist, however, may point to natural cases of B-type inconsistencies. For ex-
ample, believing p and wondering whether p seem to be B-type inconsistent attitudes, regard-
less of whether expressivism about any particular class of terms is correct. Baker and Woods
(2015) discuss further natural examples of B-type inconsistencies and conclude that they are
no less familiar than A-type inconsistencies. May the expressivist, therefore, turn the negation
problem on its head? We are inclined to take the inconsistency of Murdering is legal and Mur-
dering is not legal to display the inconsistency-transmitting property of belief. The expressivist
might claim that the very data constituting the negation problem show (i) that Murdering is
wrong and Murdering is not wrong express different types of attitude, and (ii) that these atti-
tudes are B-type inconsistent. Unfortunately for the expressivist, this will not do. At least the
5
following problems remain.
The compositional problem. The contrast between (1) and (3) brings to light the composi-
tional version of the negation problem. For these examples appear to show that expressivism
requires two types of sentential negation: an A-type negation that operates on contents, like the
not in (3b), and a B-type negation that operates on attitudes, like the not of (1b). This division
however is not reflected in language—there are no A-not or B-not realised as distinct lexical
items. Thus, in order to give a compositional semantics, one should give a uniform analysis of
the particle not as a compositional operator. It is unclear at this point how the expressivist could
do this. It is also a mistake to stipulate an ambiguity of the word ‘not’ to two distinct operators
notA and notB. In murdering is not wrong, the B-reading is mandatory and the A-reading is not
available. If an ambiguity is postulated, the unavailability of the A-type reading is still in need
of explanation.
The logicality problem. We have observed that murdering is wrong and murdering is not
wrong sound inconsistent, but we have been using the term ‘inconsistency’ quite loosely. But
murdering is wrong and murdering is not wrong are inconsistent in a formally precise way:
they are logically inconsistent, meaning that it is sufficient to understand the meaning of not to
recognise them as inconsistent; one may be entirely ignorant about the meaning of murdering
or wrong. This is in contrast to factual inconsistencies, like grass is green and grass is blue
or murdering is wrong and murdering is right. To recognise these as inconsistent, one needs
additional knowledge of the non-logical vocabulary featuring in them. However, the rough
expressivist explanation of the relevant inconsistency rests on the recognition that not modifies
the attitude expressed by wrong and that not does not modify attitude in every context. So it
seems that some understanding of wrong—at least that it is an attitude expression—is required
to recognise the inconsistency of Murdering is wrong and Murdering is not wrong, contravening
logicality.
The explanatory problem. The expressivist has made the following assumptions: (i) there
are B-type inconsistencies; (ii) for each attitude whose expression is linguistically realised
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(e.g. wrong realising the expression of disapproval) there is another attitude (e.g. tolerance) that
may not be linguistically realised; (iii) all these attitudes stand in appropriate logical relations
to one another (e.g. disapproval and tolerance towards the same act are B-type inconsistent).
Taken together, these assumptions commit the expressivist to the existence of a set of attitudes
(not all of which need to be linguistically realised) that stand in a reasonably complex web of
logical relations. The expressivist cannot just assume that this web exists, but must explain
where it comes from.
An account that must contend with the explanatory problem is due to Terence Horgan and
Mark Timmons (2006). They construct a language for logically complex attitude expressions,
starting with two basic sentence-forming operators to express descriptive is-commitment and
normative ought-commitment, respectively. They then recursively define logical connectives
on these operators, e.g. that for each operator there is another one that negates it. The meanings
of these complex operators are given by their inferential role. However, Schroeder (2008a)
incisively points out, commitments (or attitudes) cannot themselves be logically complex—
only the language that Horgan and Timmons use to describe these commitments is logically
complex. But a logically complex language might simply be overwrought and does not in itself
guarantee that its expressions denote anything, so Horgan and Timmons have yet to explain
why we should suppose the attitudes their language requires exist.
3 Inferential expressivism
3.1 A first pass
Inferential expressivism is an approach to meaning that combines aspects of expressivism and
inferentialism. As mentioned, expressivism is the view on which the meaning of a linguistic
term derives from the attitude it is used to express. Inferentialism is the view that the meaning
of a term is given by its inferential role—that is, by when one can infer sentences containing
the term, and what follows from such sentences. For example, inferentialists claim that the
following rules of inference characterise the meaning of conjunction (Gentzen, 1935; Prawitz,
1965).
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• From A and B infer A∧B.
• From A∧B infer A.
• From A∧B infer B.
We will write such inference rules in a natural deduction calculus. In this notation, the following
rules for conjunction introduction and conjunction elimination define the meaning of ∧.
A B(∧I.)
(A∧B)
(A∧B)
(∧E.1) A
(A∧B)
(∧E.2) B
Expressivism and inferentialism share an intellectual heritage. Both are motivated by supposing
that, in some sense, meaning is use. Expressivism holds that the expression of certain attitudes
is central to how a term is used (Gibbard, 2003). Inferentialists claim that inferential roles
best characterise use (Dummett, 1991; Brandom, 1994). Inferential expressivism combines
these views by specifying the meaning of an expression in terms of the attitudes one can infer
from the use of sentences that contain that expression (Chrisman, 2008; Incurvati and Schlöder,
Forthcoming).
Let’s start with the attitude of assent. For brevity—and following Rumfitt (2000)—write
+A for the expression of assent to the proposition A. Then, the inferential expressivist meaning
for conjunction is given by the following rules:
+A +B(+∧I.)
+(A∧B)
+(A∧B)
(+∧E.1) +A
+(A∧B)
(+∧E.2) +B
That is, from the expression of assent to A∧B, one can infer assent to A and assent to B (and vice
versa). At first, that may seem like an odd notion of inference. Indeed, as noted by Greg Re-
stall (2005) there is a mind-cluttering problem here (see also Harman, 1986). Since arbitrarily
many propositions follow from any proposition A (A∧A, A∧A∧A, ...), inferential expressiv-
ism seems to entail that anyone who assents to a single proposition assents to an unbounded
number of propositions. This is cognitively implausible, so the inferential expressivist needs
to be more precise about what she means. The proper understanding of inferred assent here
is social: the meaning-conferring rules define which attitudes one is committed to have (see
also Dutilh Novaes, 2015; Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017). For instance, given (+∧I.), someone
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who explicitly assents to A and to B may not be in a mental state that includes assent to A∧B
(since she may fail to draw the inference corresponding to (+∧I.)). Rather, she is committed to
assenting to A∧B, since if the inference is pointed out to her, she must assent to A∧B or admit
to a mistake.
The advantages of inferential expressivism can be appreciated by considering the case of
negation. Traditional expressivism takes the connection between a term receiving expressivist
treatment and the attitude it expresses to be direct: the term itself expresses an attitude (Ayer,
1936; Stevenson, 1937). Thus, traditional expressivism about negation holds that not expresses
an attitude; call it dissent. Inferential expressivism, by contrast, takes the relation between
negation and the expression of dissent to be inferential. That is, not does not directly express
dissent, but from the use of a sentence containing a negation as the main operator one can infer
that the speaker dissents. Such accounts of negation have been developed within the bilateral
programme in the philosophy of logic (Smiley, 1996; Rumfitt, 2000; Incurvati and Schlöder,
2017) and we now show how these accounts can be regarded as a special case of inferential
expressivism.
3.2 Bilateralism and inferential expressivism about negation
Gottlob Frege (1919) argued that rejecting a proposition is the same as asserting its negation.
Towards a reductio—in what is known as the Frege–Geach argument—he supposes that not is
a speech-act marker for rejection. He then notes the following valid inference.
(4) a. If not p, then not q.
b. Not p.
c. Not q.
Frege points out that the not p in (4a) cannot be a rejection of p, since somebody uttering (4a)
might assent to p. Thus, the not in (4a) must modify the proposition p (instead of indicating a
speech act about it). Suppose we nevertheless insist that in unembedded contexts such as (4b)
not p is a speech-act marker for rejection. Then, (4b) is a rejection of p. But this means that
(4b) does not coincide with the antecedent of (4a), and so (4) cannot be validated by modus
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ponens. For the inference to be an instance of modus ponens, the not in (4b) must modify p.
But then not does not indicate rejection.
As pointed out by Timothy Smiley (1996), while the Frege–Geach problem does show that
not should not be analysed as indicating rejection, this does not mean that one cannot explain
negation by appealing to the speech act of rejection. Smiley points out that there is an independ-
ent and non-embeddable way of indicating rejection. To wit, posing a polar question to oneself
and answering negatively performs a rejection. Similarly, answering positively performs an
assertion.
(5) a. Is it [the case that] p? Yes! asserts p
b. Is it [the case that] p? No! rejects p
Smiley notes that these speech acts can figure in inferences. In particular, he draws attention to
inferences such as (6).
(6) a. Is it the case that, if q, then p? Yes!
b. Is it the case that p? No!
c. Is it the case that q? No!
One might claim that Is it the case that p? No! is simply a different way of asserting It is not the
case that p and analyse (6) as modus tollens. However, Smiley notes, one can recognise (6) as
valid without theorising about the nature of negation at all. Roughly, someone uttering (6a,b)
cannot assert q on pain of being inconsistent: asserting q would entail p by (6a) and the standard
semantics of the conditional, which is inconsistent with the rejection of p in (6b). By virtue of
being unable to (consistently) assert q, she is committed to reject q (6c). This reasoning did
not make any mention of negation. Similarly, we may consider an inference similar to (4), but
where we make explicit that the minor premiss and conclusion are rejections.
(7) a. Is it the case that, if not p, then not q? Yes!
b. Is it the case that p? No!
c. Is it the case that q? No!
But now we have a puzzle. The speech act indicators (5) that Smiley postulates are non-
embeddable—if is it the case that p? No!, then... borders on incomprehensible—but as shown
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by (6) and (7) they can nonetheless feature in inferences. To simply reduce not p to Is it p?
No! seems unsatisfactory due to the divergent embedding behaviour of these phrases (Rumfitt,
2000). But if (7b) is not reducible to the antecedent of (7a), then—following the structure of
the Frege–Geach argument—how can (7) be valid?
Classically conceived, propositional logic considers only asserted content (Frege, 1879).
However, based on the above arguments, Smiley (1996) concludes that the best explanation of
all the data—including (6) and (7)—distinguishes two kinds of content: asserted and rejected.
Thus, logic should be bilateral, i.e. defined in terms of both assertion and rejection. The bilat-
eralist logician takes Is it p? No! to be an (unembeddable) speech-act indicator and not to be
an (embeddable) compositional operator that is appropriately related to the speech act of rejec-
tion. Relations of this kind should, among other things, explain the validity of inferences like
(7). Earlier work by Ian Rumfitt (2000) and ourselves (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017) specifies
these relations to be inferential and takes them to be constitutive (i.e. meaning-conferring) of
the negation connective.
This can be seen as an inferential expressivist account of negation. First, we may suppose
that speech acts are expressions of attitudes; call the attitude expressed by assertion assent and
the attitude expressed by rejection dissent. (This should come as an entirely natural step in the
context of the Frege–Geach debate: Frege’s arguments about speech acts are typically thought
of as arguments about attitude expressions.) Following Smiley, we can hence consider answers
to self-posed polar questions to be non-embeddable expressions of attitude.
(8) a. Is it [the case that] p? Yes! asserts p and thereby expresses assent to p
b. Is it [the case that] p? No! rejects p and thereby expresses dissent from p
Then, Rumfitt (2000) proposes the following inferences to be (part of) the meaning of negation:
(i) From assent to a negated proposition, one can infer dissent from the bare proposition; and
(ii) from assent to a proposition, one can infer dissent from its negation. Again writing + for
assent and now 	 for dissent, we can state these inferences as follows.
+¬A(+¬E.) 	A
+A(	¬I.) 	¬A
According to inferential expressivism, these rules (partially) constitute the meaning of nega-
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tion: they state which attitudes one can infer from attitudes towards negated propositions, and
from which attitudes one can infer (other) attitudes about negated propositions. For instance,
uttering Murdering is not legal according to the bilateralist expresses assent to the proposition
¬legal(m). The meaning of this proposition is given by the inferential roles of its constituents;
in particular the role of ¬, which is stated in terms of both assertion and rejection. Part of this
meaning is that from assent to ¬legal(m) one can infer dissent from legal(m) per (+¬E.). This
is in contrast to traditional expressivism about not that holds that uttering Murdering is not
legal would directly express dissent from legal(m).
The precise statement of the meaning-conferring rules for negation varies across the liter-
ature; compare, e.g., Rumfitt (2000), Francez (2014) and Incurvati and Schlöder (2017). We
elaborate our preferred rules further below. Taking negation to have these rules, however, is
not sufficient to explain all the data considered above. The bilateralist also needs coördination
principles governing the interaction between assent and dissent (or between assertion and rejec-
tion). Following Smiley (1996) and Rumfitt (2000), we adopt the following Smileian reductio
principles.
+A 	A(Rejection) ⊥
[+A]
...
⊥(SR1) 	A
[	A]
...
⊥(SR2) +A
These rules define assent and dissent to be contrary attitudes: (Rejection) states that it is in-
consistent to assent to and dissent from the same proposition;4 the (SR)’s state that whenever
it is inconsistent to hold one attitude towards some content, one is committed to hold the other
one.5 Together with bilateral modus ponens—the rule for conditional elimination (+→E.)—
this suffices to explain Smiley’s inference (6): if (6a) +q→ p and (6b)	p, then the supposition
+p entails ⊥ by modus ponens and (Rejection). Smileian reductio1 then allows us to infer (6c)
	p.
4This does not mean that one cannot simultaneously assent to and dissent from the same proposition (for ex-
ample, one can compartmentalise). Rather, the relevant sense of inconsistency here is that two attitude expressions
are inconsistent when they result in a communicative breakdown (Baker and Woods, 2015, p414).
5Smiley (1996) and Rumfitt (2000) do not consider these principles to be in need of further justification, but
linguistic and conceptual evidence for their validity is given in Francez (2014) and Incurvati and Schlöder (2017).
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+(A→ B) +A
(+→E.)
+B
Bilateralism—as a form of inferential expressivism—succeeds in meeting the (original) Frege–
Geach challenge head on. Bilateralists agree with Frege that attitude expressions do not embed:
the attitude expressions in (8) are linguistically unembeddable and the signs + and 	 decorate
formulae and hence cannot embed either. Bilateralists also accept Frege’s conclusion that, as a
result, not cannot be an attitude expression, since it embeds. But, they continue, this does not
mean that the meaning of not cannot be explained by appealing to the attitude of dissent. The
general semantic framework of inferential expressivism makes clear what kind of meanings
bilateralists are proposing for negation: they explain not by stating which attitudes one can
infer from the use of not.
However, the bilateralist strategy to explain negation raises a question. Bilateralists seem
to uncritically take as basic two attitudes and stipulate them to stand in a B-type inconsistency
relation to one another (per the Smileian reductio rules). Does bilateralism therefore fall prey
to the negation version of the Frege–Geach problem?
3.3 Bilateralism and the negation problem
Bilateralists take it as primitive that it is inconsistent to simultaneously assent to and dissent
from the same proposition. Some may object that this already falls prey to the negation prob-
lem: the bilateralist owes an explanation of why these attitudes are inconsistent. But this objec-
tion is unfair.
It should be uncontroversial that one needs to take some basic type of inconsistency as
primitive. Schroeder (2008a) posits as basic (i) the familiar truth-conditional inconsistency
between a proposition and its negation; and (ii) the fact that some attitudes (such as belief
and intent) are inconsistency-transmitting. The A-type inconsistency of believing that p and
believing that not p follows from p and not p being truth-conditionally inconsistent and from
this inconsistency being transmitted to the level of belief. The bilateralist, by contrast, posits
as basic (i) the B-type inconsistency of assent and dissent; and (ii) that negation is explained
by its inferential relation to the expression of dissent. This explains the supposedly A-type
inconsistency of believing that p and believing that not p by noting that someone who believes
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that p must assent to p, and someone who believes that not p must dissent from p—and it is
inconsistent to both assent and dissent from p.
Abstracting from there, we can say that there are A-type expressivists like Schroeder (2008a)
who posit A-type inconsistency as basic and attempt to reduce apparent B-type inconsistencies
to A-type.6 But on the other side of the aisle there are the bilateralists, who take B-type incon-
sistency as basic and attempt to reduce apparent A-type inconsistencies to B-type. Both groups
need to take some kind of inconsistency as basic and use it to explain the other one.
The A-type expressivist might further demand an explanation of the bilateralist of why
assent and dissent are inconsistent—supposedly, asking the bilateralist to provide some fun-
damental property of the mind that would entail this inconsistency. But the bilateralist might
equally demand an explanation of why some attitudes are inconsistency-transmitting—asking
the A-type expressivist to name the underlying reason that explains why belief transmits incon-
sistencies, but wonder does not. So in terms of explanatory credentials, A-type expressivism
and bilateralism are on equal footing.
To be sure, the negation problem we discussed in Section 2 is not thereby solved. Both
A-type expressivists and bilateralists still need to explain compositionality and logicality. In
addition, the bilateralist has not yet provided a semantics for wrong. At this stage, we are
merely defending the starting point of bilateralism—that there are two attitudes we may call
assent and dissent that stand in a B-type inconsistency relation—against the charge of being
unexplanatory.
Also, we do not claim that the whole of the explanatory challenge is unfair. Those express-
ivists like Horgan and Timmons (2006) that have logical operators such as negation generating
new operators for attitude expressions are fairly challenged with having to explain what these
attitudes are and why they have the required logical properties. But the bilateralist does not do
anything like this. Horgan and Timmons claim that a logical complex sentence expresses a lo-
6Schroeder (2008a) himself explains the apparent B-type inconsistency between Murdering is wrong and Mur-
dering is not wrong as the A-type inconsistency between being for blaming for murdering and being for not
blaming for murdering, stipulating that being for is an inconsistency-transmitting attitude. We discuss this further
in Section 4.
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gically complex attitude; the meaning of this attitude, they continue, is defined by its inferential
role. The bilateralists agree with Schroeder (2008a) that there are no logically complex atti-
tudes. They state the meanings of attitude expressions as inferential roles, but the complexity
lies with the contents of those attitudes. To wit, the bilateralist deals in simple attitudes (assent
or dissent), held towards logically complex propositions. Furthermore, the two basic attitudes
of the bilateralists and their logical properties (given by Smileian reductio) are linguistically
observable (instead of being generated by logical vocabulary). While Horgan and Timmons
(and others) do have an explanatory problem, the bilateralists do not.
Schroeder (2008a) nevertheless considers A-type expressivism superior, since ‘B-type in-
consistency is not something that expressivists can take for granted, because there are no good
examples of it’ (p48). However, there are natural examples of attitudes that stand in a rela-
tion of B-type inconsistency, e.g. belief and wonder, or in other logical relations, e.g. certainty
entails belief. Such attitudes and their logical relations are linguistically observable, and in
terms of explanation are on a par with the observation that certain attitudes (like belief ) are
inconsistency-transmitting (Baker and Woods, 2015).
In sum, either there is no explanatory problem for the bilateralist or there is an analogous
problem for the A-type expressivist. However, there is a serious explanatory challenge for ex-
pressivists that (i) take as basic attitudes and logical properties that are not observable, but are
needed to make expressivist semantics work, or (ii) take both A-type and B-type inconsistency
as basic. The bilateralist does neither. Both assent and dissent, as well as their logical proper-
ties, are linguistically observable by examining the speech acts of assertion and rejection. And
A-type inconsistency is explained in terms of B-type inconsistency.
The bilateralist still needs to address the aspects of the negation problem related to com-
positionality and logicality and to include normative vocabulary in her account. To this end,
we show how bilateral semantics can be extended to a multilateral semantics by taking fur-
ther linguistically observable attitudes as primitive. We first present the inferential expressivist
account of the epistemic modal might. This analysis of epistemic modals will be helpful in un-
derstanding the inferential expressivist account of wrong and in solving the new new negation
problem in Section 4.
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3.4 Inferential expressivism beyond negation
According to Smiley (1996), posing a polar question to oneself and answering it is one way of
realising attitude expressions. He restricts attention to the answers Yes! and No!, but as we note
in Incurvati and Schlöder (Forthcoming), there is a third possible answer: Perhaps!.7 We call
the speech act performed by answering Perhaps! to a polar question weak assertion and the
attitude it expresses weak assent. As before, we mark assent with +, dissent with 	 and now
weak assent with ⊕.
(9) a. Is it p? Yes! asserts p and thereby expresses assent to p (+p)
b. Is it p? No! rejects p and thereby expresses dissent from p (	p)
c. Is it p? Perhaps! weakly asserts p and thereby expresses weak assent from p (⊕p)
But how should we characterise these speech acts? Stalnaker (1978) famously argued that the
essential effect of an assertion is a proposal to add a proposition to the common ground (or
to accept such a proposal).8 Within this framework, it is natural to take the essential effect
of a rejection as that of marking a proposition as not being accepted in the common ground
because the speaker dissents from it. This means that rejections can be weak (Dickie, 2010;
Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017): asserting not p may be stronger than rejecting p, since there are
circumstances where one may dissent from a proposition and its negation. The following is a
natural example:
(10) Alice: X or Y will win the election.
Bob: Is it the case that X or Y will win? No! X or Y or Z will win.
Bob is here dissenting from pX or Y will winq, as is expressed by the particle no. But it would
be a mistake to read Bob’s rejection as expressing assent to pit is not the case that X or Y will
7There is linguistic evidence for perhaps being a force-indicator similar to Yes! and No! (Incurvati and
Schlöder, Forthcoming). Notably, perhaps does not embed in e.g. the antecedents of conditionals (#if perhaps
it is raining,...), exactly as one would expect of a force indicator.
8The widespread view that an assertion immediately results in the addition of a proposition to the common
ground is based on a misreading of Stalnaker. He is explicit that addition to the common ground is pending
acceptance (1978, fn. 9) and we agree.
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winq, since this would entail that he assents to pneither X nor Y will winq. But it seems that
Bob is dissenting from that proposition as well—he leaves open who wins.
What about weak assertion? We take this speech act to have the essential effect of rejecting
a negative (see Incurvati and Schlöder, Forthcoming for details). Consider again (10). While
dissent from pX or Y will winq is part of the content of Bob’s utterance, dissent from pneither
X nor Y will winq is merely conveyed via a pragmatic implicature: if Bob had not intended to
dissent from pneither X nor Y will winq, he would have explicitly assented to pZ will winq.
Indeed, this implicature can be cancelled.
(11) Alice: X or Y will win the election.
Bob: Is it the case that X or Y will win? No! X or Y or Z will win. In fact, Z will.
As we argue in Incurvati and Schlöder (Forthcoming), weak assertion is the mechanism by
which Bob can explicitly express dissent from pneither X nor Y will winq here. Compare (12),
where this effect of uttering perhaps—that one is dissenting from pneither X nor Y will winq—
is non-cancellable.
(12) Is it the case that X or Y will win? Perhaps! #In fact, neither of them will.
Thus, weakly asserting X or Y will win by way of answering Perhaps! rejects the negative of
pX or Y will winq (and nothing more). By generalisation, this explains the following inference
rules for negation.
⊕A(	¬I.) 	¬A
	¬A(	¬E.) ⊕A
	A(⊕¬I.) ⊕¬A
⊕¬A(⊕¬E.) 	A
That is, if one dissents from a negative, one is committed to weakly assent to the non-negated
proposition and vice versa. And if one weakly assents to a negative, one is committed to dissent
from the non-negated proposition and vice versa. According to inferential expressivism, these
rules are meaning-conferring for the negation operator.
Now, as we show in Incurvati and Schlöder (Forthcoming), one can similarly give rules that
define the meaning of the epistemic modal might (formalised as ♦). We cannot go into detail
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here, but one can easily see that asserting it might be that p is inferentially equivalent to Is it p?
Perhaps! and that perhaps iterates with might. Thus, the following rules give the meaning of
epistemic modals.
⊕A(+♦I.)
+♦A
+♦A(+♦E.) ⊕A
⊕A(⊕♦I.) ⊕♦A
⊕♦A(⊕♦E.) ⊕A
When we add the rules for epistemic modals, the following rules are derivable, which tell
us how negation interacts with assent. Later, these rules will be useful to characterise the
meaning of murdering might be wrong and to account for the distinction between an utterance
of Murdering is wrong and Murdering might be wrong.
	♦A(+¬I.)
+¬A
+¬A(+¬E.) 	♦A
Since our semantics now is multilateral in that it takes more than two attitudes as basic, we need
additional principles to coördinate assent and weak assent. These are the rules of (Assertion)
and (Weak Inference).
+A(Assertion) ⊕A
[+A]
...
+B ⊕A(Weak Inference)
if (+♦E.) and (⊕♦E.) were not used to derive +B and
only +ed premisses occur in the derivation of +B.⊕B
The justification of (Assertion) is straightforward: if someone assents to A, she cannot also
assent to not A (pace paraconsistent logics), so she is committed to dissent from not A. The
coördination principle (Weak Inference) is justified by the evident validity of inferences like
(13):
(13) a. Is it the case that if A, then B? Yes!
b. Is it the case that A? Perhaps!
c. Is it the case that B? Perhaps!
Like Smiley’s modus tollens-like inference (6), (13) is a valid scheme that needs to be accounted
for by the coördination of the fundamental attitudes. We justify the proof-theoretic restrictions
of (Weak Inference) elsewhere (Incurvati and Schlöder, Forthcoming); they are related to issues
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arising from weak attitudes interacting with conditionals in unexpected ways (Kolodny and
MacFarlane, 2010; Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017).9
The expressive inferentialist approach to negation and epistemic modality has a number of
desirable properties. Write `EML (Epistemic Multilateral Logic) for the proof theory containing
all above inference rules. The resulting account then satisfies the following desiderata identified
in the prior literature.10
• Classicality of assent: if A ` B in classical logic, then +A `EML +B.
• Epistemic contradiction (Yalcin, 2007; Mandelkern, 2019): +(A∧♦¬A) `EML ⊥.
• Non-factive might (Russell and Hawthorne, 2016): +♦A 6`EML +A.
• Rejection/dissent is weak (Dickie, 2010): 	A 6`EML +¬A.
• Negation entails dissent (Rumfitt, 2000): +¬A `EML 	A and +A `EML 	¬A.
Epistemic Multilateral Logic is sound and complete with respect to an appropriate model theory
and the calculus can be extended in a natural way to include quantifiers (Aloni et al., ms).
To sum up, we have an inferential expressivist account of not and might that takes as basic
the attitudes of assent, dissent and weak assent. The relation between the attitudes is charac-
terised by the coördination principles, and the meaning of not and might is constituted by the
above rules for their introduction and elimination. As argued above for bilateralism, our multi-
lateral account is not subject to the explanatory part of the negation problem. The fundamental
attitudes we make use of are linguistically observable, as are the logical properties encoded as
coördination principles. We now apply this framework to normative vocabulary.
9For the same reasons, this account of epistemic modals does not satisfy the conditional proof rule that from
+A entailing +B, one can infer +A→ B. Rather, one is only entitled to infer +A→ B if the inference to +B from
+A satisfies the restrictions on (Weak Inference).
10Some may believe the first three to be intrinsically incompatible, because +(A∧♦¬A)→⊥ classically entails
+♦A `+A . However, Epistemic contradiction does not entail +(A∧♦¬A)→⊥ because of the restrictions on the
conditional proof rule.
19
3.5 Inferential expressivism about normative vocabulary
According to traditional expressivism, the semantic value of wrong is the expression of disap-
proval. According to inferential expressivism, the semantic value of wrong is that having the
attitude of assent towards a proposition like pmurdering is wrongqmeans that one can infer the
attitude of disapproval towards pmurderingq. That is, as above for the terms not and might,
the meaning of wrong is given by how attitudes towards propositions containing wrong infer-
entially interact with other attitudes towards different contents. In particular, the inferential
expressivist meaning of wrong is given by the following rules of inference (writing D for the
attitude of disapproval).
Da(+W I.)
+wrong(a)
+wrong(a)
(+WE.)
Da
This semantics provides enough places to insert a negation, since wrong is treated as an em-
beddable predicate. The attitude expressed by uttering Murdering is wrong is +wrong(m), the
attitude expressed by Not murdering is wrong is +wrong(¬m)11
What does +¬wrong(m) mean? The glib answer is that the meaning of this attitude expres-
sion is given by the inference rules that define the meaning of ¬ and the rules that define the
meaning of wrong.12 This may be too glib to be satisfactory, so let us explore this inferential
11To our knowledge, nobody in this debate has commented much on how one negates the logical form of subject
gerunds like murdering (notably, Schroeder (2008a, p.73ff) relegates this question to a logic of blaming that he
leaves open). We suppose that wrong(¬m) is a placeholder for a more complex first order formula. Linguistic
evidence suggests that subject gerunds are quantificational (Portner, 1995), so, plausibly, wrong(m) stands for
∀x.act-of-murder(x)→ wrong(x). Some care is required to negate this, however. Not murdering is wrong should
not entail that any non-murdering action is wrong, as this would mean that everything except murder is wrong.
One could let wrong(¬m) stand for ∀Dx.¬act-of-murder(x)→wrong(x) where the universal quantifier is restricted
to a domain D that stems from a presupposed set of alternatives; alternatively, not murdering could be interpreted
as a term negation, viz. ∀x.act-of-un-murder(x)→ wrong(x). The former approach appears to be supported by
linguistic evidence (Portner, 1995). We leave this matter open, but note that our semantics for negation and
normative vocabulary would work for either.
12This, to stress, differentiates inferential expressivism from the proposal of Horgan and Timmons (2006): they
describe the meaning of Murdering is not wrong as a logically complex attitude. We describe pMurdering is not
wrongq as a logically complex proposition towards which one may have attitudes.
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meaning.
First, +¬wrong(m) clearly entails 	wrong(m), i.e. dissent from pmurdering is wrongq.
This means that the speaker is committed to disagree with any expression of disapproval
of pmurderingq. But dissent from pmurdering is wrongq is already entailed by assent to
pmurdering might not be wrongq and there clearly is a difference between uttering Murder-
ing is not wrong and Murdering might not be wrong. Indeed, +¬wrong(m) entails something
stronger, namely 	♦wrong(m), i.e. dissent from pmurder might be wrongq. But in what sense
exactly is this stronger than dissent from pmurder is wrongq? We can characterise	♦wrong(m)
attitude as a special kind of dissent from pmurdering is wrongq. Namely, stable dissent.
The attitude of assent is stable in the sense that if one assents to a proposition p one cannot
come to stop assenting to p by simply being provided additional information—it requires a
change of mind to stop assenting (Restall, 2005). But, in general, if one dissents from p or
weakly assents to p, one may come to change these attitudes merely by receiving additional
information (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017). The difference in stability can also be observed
when considering the speech acts that are used to express these attitudes.
(14) Alice: X or Y will win the election.
Bob: Is it the case that X or Y will win? No! X or Y or Z will win.
As argued above, the essential effects of our three speech acts are as follows: an assertion puts
forward a proposal to accept a proposition into common ground; a rejection marks a proposition
as not being accepted into common ground; and a weak assertion rejects a negative. Assertion
is stable in the sense that once a proposition is in the common ground, it remains in it unless
the common ground is revised. A rejection, however, is unstable in that a previously rejected
proposition can become common ground simply because other, new information is added to
the common ground and hence without any revision of the common ground.
(14) is an example of this phenomenon: Bob’s utterance marks pX or Y will winq as unac-
cepted into the common ground. But if the proposition pX or Y or Z will winq asserted by Bob
does become common ground and later Alice and Bob add pZ dropped outq to the common
ground as well, pX or Y will winq will enter the common ground after all, but without any
revision of the common ground. Hence, Bob’s rejection of pX or Y will winq was unstable, as
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undoing it required no revision. The case for weak assertion being unstable is analogous.
Thus, our account has the resources to distinguish between saying Murdering is not wrong
and Murdering might not be wrong. By uttering either sentence, the speaker can express dis-
sent from the proposition pmurdering is wrongq. However, uttering murdering is not wrong
expresses stable dissent (i.e. changing this attitude would be a change of mind), whereas ut-
tering Murdering might not be wrong expresses unstable dissent—the speaker may come to
express something else about murdering without changing their mind, simply by receiving ad-
ditional information. The formal expression of stable dissent from a proposition p is 	♦p,
which is inferentially equivalent to +¬p. Thus, the inferential meaning of pmurdering is not
wrongq is the expression of stable dissent from pmurdering is wrongq.
Note that we did not introduce an auxiliary attitude (such as tolerance) to account for what is
expressed by uttering Murdering is not wrong—we only need the three foundational attitudes
of expressive inferentialism together with the attitude of disapproval. If someone wishes to
call the attitude expressed by 	♦wrong(m) by the name tolerance of murder, she can do so—
and this may be a useful and illuminating shorthand. But only a shorthand. The inferential
expressivist does not need to take the attitude of tolerance as a primitive.
In sum, inferential expressivism solves the negation problem for expressivism about wrong.
The aspects of compositionality and logicality are accounted for by the fact that inferential
expressivism posits the same negation operator for descriptive and normative language. The
explanatory problem is avoided by not stipulating any auxiliary or complex attitudes, instead
explaining the meaning of Murdering is not wrong by appealing to the joint inferential meaning
of not and wrong.
The account straightforwardly generalises to further normative vocabulary like right. Sup-
posedly, traditional expressivism takes right to be the expression of approval. Hence, according
to inferential expressivism, the semantics of right is such that one can infer approval from as-
sent to a sentence containing right. That is, the meaning of right is given by the following rules
(writing A for the attitude of approval).
A a(+RI.)
+right(a)
+right(a)
(+RE.)
A a
The meaning of sentences like Murdering is not right is then explained analogously to the
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above explanations of Murdering is not wrong. However, there is now one more inconsistency
to address: the factual inconsistency of Murdering is wrong and Murdering is right. To derive
this, we need to add an axiom encoding the inconsistency:
(RW-contradiction) +¬(right(a)∧wrong(a))
It is then immediate to derive the desired inconsistency. Note that (RW-contradiction) is not
a coördination principle expressing fundamental properties of primitive attitudes, but an ax-
iom expressing lexical knowledge about right and wrong. This is because the inconsistency
of Murdering is wrong and Murdering is right is not logical, but relies on additional lexical
knowledge.
4 The new and new new negation problems
4.1 Schroeder on the negation problem
Schroeder (2008a) defends an A-type account of wrong. Instead of analysing the attitude ex-
pressed by wrong as disapproval, he analyses it as being for blaming for, stipulating being for
as his only primitive attitude. This allows him to insert a negation in the right place: Murdering
is not wrong is analysed as being for pnot blaming for murderingq. Then Schroeder claims
that being for is an inconsistency-transmitting attitude (like belief), thereby accounting for all
relevant data. This is remarkably elegant, but Schroeder himself notes some issues.
Notably, he acknowledges the new negation problem (NNP) that arises as a revenge version
of the compositionality problem. It goes as follows. To give a uniform semantics—including
both descriptive and normative vocabulary—that is grounded in the basic attitude of being
for, Schroeder analyses descriptive claims as being for proceeding as if (short, being for pai)
expressions, e.g. Murdering is legal expresses the attitude being for ppai murdering is legalq.
But then, note the following.
NNP. According to Schroeder, Murdering is wrong expresses being for pblaming for murderingq
and Murdering is legal expresses being for ppai murdering is legalq. Then, if Murdering
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is not wrong expresses being for pnot blaming for murderingq and the compositional se-
mantics of not is uniform (as it should), the meaning of Murdering is not legal would be
being for pnot pai murdering is legalq. But this is a mistake: the attitude expressed by
Murdering is not legal should be being for ppai murdering is not legalq.
In essence, the negation problem is that for normative language there is one space for a negation
missing. The new negation problem is that for descriptive language, Schroeder has one space
too many to put a negation.
To solve (NNP), Schroeder introduces the notion of a biforcated attitude. A biforcation
is a pair of two being for attitudes such that the major attitude entails the minor one.13 We
write biforcations as tuples and treat the left hand-side of a tuple to be the major attitude. What
exactly the minor attitude is is determined by the lexical semantics of the relevant predicates;
for descriptive vocabulary, one obtains the minor attitude from the major one by inserting two
negations such that, e.g., the biforcated attitude expressed by Murdering is legal is 〈being for
ppai murdering is legalq, being for pnot pai murdering is not legalq〉, where being for ppai
murdering is legalq is the major attitude (Schroeder, 2008a, p98)
Using such biforcations, Schroeder defines the meaning of negation as follows: the negation
of a biforcation inserts in both the minor and major attitude a not between being for and the
embedded action term and then switches major and minor attitude. That is, the following is
Schroeder’s compositional semantics for not (2008a, p106).
JnotK(〈being for a, being for b 〉) = 〈being for ¬b, being for ¬a〉
Thus, for instance, if a descriptive sentence A expresses the biforcation 〈being for ppai Aq,
being for p¬ pai ¬ Aq〉, then not A expresses 〈being for p¬¬ pai ¬Aq, being for p¬ pai Aq〉.
Deleting double negations, one obtains the desired major attitude being for ppai ¬Aq.
However, Schroeder now needs to insist that for normative propositions, the minor and ma-
jor attitudes in a biforcation are identical, lest he run into the original negation problem again.
For descriptive language, in contrast, the minor attitude is strictly weaker than the major one.
13The term ‘biforcated’ is Schroeder’s, a pun on ‘bifurcated’ and ‘being for’.
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This is not an ad hoc move, but part of Schroeder’s strategy: by encoding a difference between
the attitudes expressed by descriptive and normative terms on the level of lexical semantics,
he is able to maintain uniform compositional semantics for negation while solving both the
negation problem and the new negation problem. As a matter of fact, we agree that lexical
semantics is the (only) right place to locate this difference.
Unfortunately, this move leads to the new new negation problem (Schroeder, 2008a, p113).
Schroeder justifies his introduction of minor attitudes by appealing to a notion called disac-
ceptance, which consists in not agreeing with a proposition without agreeing to its negation.
Formally, on Schroeder’s account, to disaccept A is to accept the minor attitude in the biforca-
tion expressed by not A. But since normative vocabulary sentences express biforcations with
identical major and minor attitudes, the distinction between disacceptance and acceptance of
a negative collapses for normative sentences. This entails that one cannot withhold judgement
about an act X by disaccepting both pX is wrongq and pX is not wrongq. The new new negation
problem means that the only way to withhold judgement is to not express an attitude. Schroeder
notes that this is not an outright bad result, concluding that it might be ‘a bullet to bite’ (p115).
However, this bullet becomes much harder to bite when also considering epistemic might.
Schroeder suggests the following semantics for epistemic modals (p181): might deletes the
major attitude and replaces it with the minor attitude. That is, his semantics for might is as
follows.
JmightK(〈being for a, being for b〉) = 〈being for b, being for b〉
But given Schroeder’s solution to (NNP), this means that Murdering might be wrong expresses
the same attitude as Murdering is wrong, since Murdering is wrong expresses a biforcation
where minor and major attitude are the same. Schroeder (2008a, p182) concludes that hence
either his semantics for might or his identification of minor and major attitudes for normative
vocabulary must be revised. But no suitable such revision is in sight. The above semantics for
might has compelling features, as Schroeder himself notes. To preserve these, and to also make
sense of normative vocabulary under epistemic modality, Schroeder would very likely need to
revise the foundations of the biforcated attitude framework. However, it is not clear whether it
is possible to revise the framework in such a way as to solve both the original negation problem
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and the new negation problem.
4.2 Inferential expressivism and the new new negation problem
There are some remarkable structural similarities between our approach and Schroeder’s. His
appeal to disacceptance roughly corresponds to our dissent and if being for pai is understood to
be roughly like our assent, his minor attitudes are roughly like our weak assent, so his treatment
of might is also similar to ours. But the expressive inferentialist account differs in that it sees
no fundamental difference in how these attitudes operate on normative vis-á-vis descriptive
vocabulary: we do not collapse assent with weak assent anywhere, whereas Schroeder collapses
major and minor attitudes towards normative content. Accordingly, inferential expressivism
makes a distinction between sentences like Murdering might be wrong and Murdering is wrong,
solving the new new negation problem.
Now recall that to assert Murdering is not legal according to inferential expressivism is to
propose the addition of the proposition ¬legal(m) to the common ground. Since the common
ground records the tacit assumptions in a conversation, this may indeed be paraphrased as being
for pproceeding as if ¬legal(m)q. Analogously, to assert Murdering is not wrong it to propose
the addition of ¬wrong(m) to the common ground, which—by the inferential semantics of not
and wrong—is to modify the common ground so that disapproval of murdering is stably ruled
out. This can indeed be roughly paraphrased as being for pnot blaming for murderingq. Thus,
inferential expressivism, as developed in Section 3 can be examined in Schroeder’s terms. Do-
ing so shows no trace of the new negation problem. Due to the inferential expressivist treatment
of might, the new new negation problem does not occur either. But why is that? Where does
inferential expressivism draw the line that Schroeder draws when attributing different minor
attitudes to descriptive and normative vocabulary?
Inferential expressivism locates this difference in whether meaning-conferring inference
rules change attitude. The semantics of descriptive vocabulary is given by rules which do not
change attitude, such as from assent to X, infer assent to Y (e.g. the meaning of bachelor in-
cludes that from assent to pJohn is a bachelorq one may infer assent to pJohn is unmarriedq).
The semantics of normative vocabulary is given by rules which do change attitude. For in-
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stance, wrong switches between assent and disapproval. This is why if one negates wrong,
it may appear that one negates an attitude (namely, disapproval, the attitude wrong switches
with), whereas this is not so when negating a descriptive term. Like Schroeder, we locate the
difference between normative and descriptive vocabulary at the level of lexical semantics, and
in particular in the way the rules of inferences constituting this semantics characterise the in-
teraction of these terms with attitudes. This allows us to have uniform semantics for operators
such as negation. Unlike Schroeder, we do not need to collapse any of our notions to do so.
5 Conclusion
We have argued that bilateralism is best understood as a form of inferential expressivism about
negation: the meaning of negation is given in terms of its inferential connections to the expres-
sion of certain attitudes. Crucially, bilateralists make use of at least two distinct attitudes, assent
and dissent, which they coördinate to stand in particular relations. Smiley (1996) argued that
this move solves the original version of the Frege–Geach problem. We have demonstrated that
this move also solves its negation version. In particular, bilateralism is not subject to the ex-
planatory aspect of the negation problem, since its foundational assumptions are on a par with
the assumptions made by A-type expressivists that certain attitudes transmit the inconsistency
of truth and falsity.
Previous work of ours has extended inferential expressivism to a multilateral semantics
which also accounts for the meaning of epistemic modals. In this paper, we have further ex-
panded inferential expressivism so as to encompass moral vocabulary such as wrong. Thus,
according to inferential expressivism about moral vocabulary, the meaning of wrong is given in
terms of its inferential connections with the attitude of disapproval.
The following is an oft-told story about the metaethical landscape. Ethical cognitivism
takes moral sentences to express beliefs but, unlike expressivism, has difficulty in explaining
the motivating power of moral judgments. Traditional ethical expressivism takes moral sen-
tences to express non-cognitive attitudes, but, unlike cognitivism, falls prey to the Frege-Geach
problem. Hybrid approaches (see, e.g., Copp, 2001; Barker, 2002; Boisvert, 2008; Ridge, 2014)
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attempt to have ‘the best of both worlds’ by taking moral sentences to express beliefs and non-
cognitive attitudes. However, such approaches, in the end, fall prey to the standard problems
for cognitivism or expressivism, and fail to properly explain the connection between the two
alleged components of moral judgments.
According to inferential expressivism about normative vocabulary, the connection between
assent to Murdering is wrong and the attitude of disapproval is clearly articulated by the rules
of inference for wrong. Moreover, we have demonstrated that this approach solves the original
version of the Frege-Geach problem as well as the negation version and iterations thereof. In
particular, it improves on Schroeder’s (2008a) A-type theory, which assigns the same meaning
to Murdering is wrong and Murdering might be wrong. We submit that inferential expressivism,
like traditional expressivism, also has the resources to explain the motivating power of moral
judgments, since on this view pmurdering is wrongq commits the speaker to having the attitude
of disapproval towards pmurderingq. If this claim can be made out, inferential expressivism
might well be the best of both worlds.14
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